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ABSTRACT
The objective of this study is to determine which motives play a
significant role in determining the extent of a firm’s repurchasing activity. For
firms repurchasing through the open market, the motives include taking
advantage

of perceived

undervaluation,

increasing financial

leverage,

distributing cash to shareholders, and reducing agency costs. For firms using
a

tender offer,

the

motives

include taking advantage of perceived

undervaluation and having the ability to significantly increase financial
leverage.

Also, the hypothesis that the perceived undervaluation motive is

stronger for smaller firms is tested.

Three censored regression models are

employed, and each model’s explanatory variables represent commonly cited
motives for repurchasing stock.
Repurchasing activity is measured by the amount of cash distributed to
shareholders through share repurchases expressed as a percentage of the
firm’s average market capitalization.

The final sample includes 596 open

market repurchasing firms, 11 tender offer repurchasing firms, and 991 nonrepurchasing firms. The cross-sectional analysis covers the firm’s fiscal year
ending between March 31,1996 and April 1,1997.
There are three primary conclusions of this study.

First, perceived

undervaluation, financial leverage, excess cash, and agency costs all play

iii
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important roles in determining the percentage of market capitalization a firm
repurchases in the open market. Second, no evidence is found to support the
hypothesis that perceived undervaluation and financial leverage impact the
percentage of market capitalization a firm repurchases through a tender offer.
This is possibly due to the fact that only 11 tender offers were observed during
the period studied. The third conclusion is that small firms are more likely to
repurchase stock in order to take advantage of perceived undervaluation.

iv
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Corporations primarily distribute cash to common shareholders through
dividends and share repurchases.
preferred

method,

but share

Dividends have historically been the

repurchases are

growing

in

popularity.

Announced dollar repurchases grew at an annual compound rate of 18.4%
from 1983 to 1996.1 Also, in 1995 the dollars distributed through repurchases
roughly equaled the dollars paid in dividends.2 Some firms, like Microsoft, only
repurchase stock, while others, like Wal-Mart, pay dividends and buy back
stock.

According to Securities Data Corporation, there were over 6,250

repurchase announcements from 1990 to 1996.
The primary methods used for repurchasing stock are tender offers and
open market repurchases. A company using a tender offer typically agrees to
buy a certain percentage of its outstanding shares at a stated price on a
specified date from those shareholders that indicate a willingness to sell. Firms
generally repurchase about 15% of their equity in a tender offer, and the

1 Source: Securities Data Corporation.
2 Brigham and Gapenski, page 691.

1
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average premium offered is 22% above the market price prior to the
repurchase announcement.3
Many motivations for tender offers have been suggested, but the
consensus view is that tender offers are typically used by companies to take
advantage of perceived undervaluation.4

For example, Lakonishok and

Vermaelen (1990) find that firms announcing a tender offer generally earn
positive risk-adjusted returns during the two-year period following the
repurchase announcement.

They conclude that the market generally

underestimated the information value of a tender offer announcement during
the 1980 to 1990 period. Their findings support the perceived undervaluation
(information signaling) motive.
An open market repurchase is more flexible than a tender offer and often
takes place over several years. Open market repurchase plans are generally
announced, and the announcement usually states the amount and duration of
the planned repurchases. For example, General Motors announced in early
1998 that it will buy an additional $4 billion of its stock over the subsequent
twelve months in order to return capital to its shareholders.5 An open market
repurchasing company buys its shares through one broker, and sellers are

3 See Oann (1981); Vermaelen (1981); and Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1990).
4 See Vermaelen (1981); Dann (1981); Asquith and Mullins (1986); Ofer and Thakor (1987);
Constantinides and Grundy (1989); and Hausch and Seward (1993).
5 Wall Street Journal. February 10,1998.
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unaware they are selling to the company * The average announcement period
abnormal return is 3.5 % / According to Securities Data Corporation, about
90% of all announced repurchases in the 1986 to 1995 period were to be
carried out through the open market.
Unlike tender offers, there is a lack of consensus as to the general
motivation(s) for open market repurchases.

Some researchers suggest that

companies repurchase stock in the open market in order to take advantage of
perceived undervaluation. However, as Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1996) point
out, it is doubtful that perceived undervaluation is the only motivation for an
open market repurchase because of the fact that 25% of S&P 500 firms
announced a repurchase program in 1994. It is unlikely that so many of the
most scrutinized firms believed their stock was undervalued at the same time.
Another motivation that has been offered is that firms use open market
repurchases to optimally adjust their capital structure.

Repurchasing stock

increases financial leverage, holding other factors constant. Masulis (1980)
analyzes 199 firms that used a tender offer and finds some support for the
financial leverage motive.

Rule 10B-18 under the Securities Exchange Act places four restrictions on a company
repurchasing shares in the open market. First, the company can only operate through one
broker. Second, the company cannot lead the market. Third, the company cannot buy at the
opening price or buy in the last half-hour of trading. Fourth, the company's daily repurchase
limit is equal to 25% of the previous four-week daily volume average.
See Vermaelen (1981) and Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1996).
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Others suggest that companies employ open market repurchases in
order to distribute excess cash to shareholders. In fact, Bierman and West
(1966) argue that the sole benefit of a repurchase program stems from tax
advantages over dividends. Investors are believed to prefer repurchases to
dividends because repurchases are taxed at potentially lower capital gains
rates.*
Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1996) argue that open market repurchase
plans are initiated by companies in order to create a repurchase option. This
option allows management to repurchase stock whenever they believe it is
undervalued,

thus benefiting

long-term

shareholders.

Ikenberry

and

Vermaelen find that much of the variability in the announcement period return
is explained by three determinants of option value.
Repurchase motives cited less frequently include the reissue motive and
the management entrenchment motive. The reissue motive hypothesizes that a
firm repurchases stock simply to diminish the dilution of earnings per share
caused by conversions, mergers, and/or exercised options. The management
entrenchment motive hypothesizes that management initiates a share
repurchase program in order to reduce or eliminate the probability of a
takeover.

8 Under the U.S. tax code, repurchases only receive capital gains treatment if the distribution is
not in essence replacing a dividend. Also, during the period studied here, the highest marginal
tax rate for dividends (ordinary income) was 39.6% and for capital gains was 28%.
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The literature generally contains three types of empirical studies that
relate to repurchases.

The first type examines the announcement period

returns for firms initiating a repurchase program.8 For example, Ikenberry and
Vermaelen (1996) first calculate the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for 892
firms announcing an open market repurchase plan. Next, they regress CAR on
the fraction of shares authorized for repurchase, the standard deviation of the
firm's total returns, and the firm’s R-squared from the market model. They find
that these three variables explain much of the variability in the announcement
period return among firms, and they conclude that creating a repurchase option
is an important motivation for open market repurchase plans.
The

second

type of empirical study analyzes the subsequent

performance of firms announcing repurchase programs.10

For example,

Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) find that firms announcing an
open market repurchase plan that had high book-to-market value ratios had a
four year buy-and-hold abnormal return of about 45%. They conclude that the
market inefficiently processed information related to open market repurchase
announcements during the 1980 to 1990 period. Their research suggests that,
at least for small firms, an important motivation for announcing an open market
repurchase plan is undervaluation.

9See Masulis (1080); Vermaelen (1081); Dann (1081); Netter and Mitchell (1080); Comment
and Jarrell (1001); Howe, He, and Kao (1002); and Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1006).
10See Vermaelen (1081); Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1000); Dann, Masulis, and Mayers
(1001); Bartov (1001); and Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1005).
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The third type of empirical study compares repurchasing firms to non
repurchasing firms.11 For example, Finnerty (1974) compares firms whose
number of shares decreased during the year (repurchasing firms) to firms
whose number of shares increased during the year (issuing firms). He finds
that prior to repurchase, repurchasing firms use less financial leverage and
have higher dividend yields than issuing firms.
The present study fits into the third type of empirical work dealing with
share repurchases. The objective is to determine the motivating factors that
influence some firms to repurchase large amounts of stock in the open market
or through a tender offer and other firms to repurchase little or no stock. Three
censored regression models are employed, and each model’s explanatory
variables represent commonly cited motives for repurchasing stock. For firms
repurchasing through the open market, the motives include taking advantage of
management

perceived

undervaluation,

increasing

financial

leverage,

distributing cash to shareholders, and reducing agency costs.12 For firms using
a

tender offer,

the

motives

include taking

advantage of perceived

undervaluation and having the capacity to significantly increase financial

11 See Young (1969); Norgaard and Noigaanl ( i974); and Finnerty (1975).
12 The tax savings motive, reissue motive, and management entrenchment motive are not
included in the models for various reasons. The logical approach for testing the tax savings
motive is a time series study. Bagwell and Shoven (1989) take this approach and find that
buyback activity fails to decrease following the Tax Reform Act of 1986. It is very unlikely that
the reissue motive and the management entrenchment motive explain the rapid growth rate of
repurchasing activity in the 1980s and 1990s. There is no doubt that these motives play
significant roles in some repurchasing programs, but in general they are not believed to
significantly affect repurchasing behavior.
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leverage. Also, the hypothesis that the perceived undervaluation motive is
stronger for smaller firms is tested. The goal of this study is to determine which
motive(s) play a significant role in determining the magnitude of a firm’s
repurchasing activity.13
This study differs from previous studies in several ways. First, this study
employs three censored regression models.

No other study dealing with

repurchases uses a censored regression model. Second, the time frame used
for the cross-sectional analysis is a firm’s fiscal year ending between March 31,
1996 and April 1, 1997.

Repurchasing activity has increased significantly

throughout the 1990s, and this increase may be due to changing motivations
that are not captured in earlier studies. Third, no other study considers the
impact agency costs have on share repurchases.

Statement of Problem
Why do firms repurchase stock? The most general answer, and the one
that shareholders hope to be true, is that firms repurchase stock in order to
increase shareholder wealth.

Several approaches have been taken to

determine the specific motivations for repurchasing stock. One approach is to
simply survey managers concerning their motivation(s) for a repurchase
program. A problem with this approach is that managers may not give truthful

13 Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1996) state that "repurchase programs mil be appealing to firms
with excess debt capacity, excess cash, few growth opportunities, and as the exchange model
suggests, the potential for mispricing.” In essence, this research tests their statement.
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answers.

A second approach is to infer motivations by studying firms that

announce repurchase programs. A limitation of this approach is that many
firms fail to repurchase as many shares as they announce. A third approach,
and one that has been used infrequently, is to analyze firms that actually
repurchase stock in order to deduce repurchase motivations.

This study

focuses on the amount of cash that firms distribute to shareholders through
share repurchases and the factors that explain the variability of this cash
distribution among firms.

Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study is to determine the motivating factors that
influence some firms to repurchase large amounts of stock and other firms to
repurchase little or no stock.

It is believed that the motivations for

repurchasing stock differ based on whether a firm uses a tender offer or the
open market.

Three censored regression models are employed and the

explanatory variables in each model represent commonly cited motives for
repurchasing stock. The determinants of open market repurchasing activity to
be developed and tested are perceived undervaluation, financial leverage,
excess cash, and agency costs. The determinants of tender offer repurchasing
activity to be developed and tested are perceived undervaluation and financial
leverage. This study also tests whether or not the perceived undervaluation
motive is stronger for smaller firms.
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Propositions
This study tests the following eight propositions.

Proposition 1:
Firms that appear undervalued relative to industry peers are motivated to
repurchase a greater percentage of their market capitalization in the open
market in order to benefit long-term shareholders.

Proposition 2:
Firms that use little financial leverage relative to industry peers are
motivated to repurchase a greater percentage of their market capitalization in
the open market in order to move the firm closer to its optimal capital structure.

Proposition 3:
Firms that have high cash inflows relative to industry peers are motivated
to repurchase a greater percentage of their market capitalization in the open
market. The larger a firm’s cash inflows, the greater the need to distribute cash
to shareholders, holding other factors constant.

Proposition 4:
Firms that have lower investment cash outflows are motivated to
repurchase a larger percentage o f their market capitalization in the open
market. The smaller the firm's investment cash outflows, the greater the need
to distribute cash to shareholders, holding other factors constant.
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Proposition 5:
Firms that have more diverse ownership structures will repurchase a
larger percentage of their market capitalization in the open market in order to
reduce agency costs.

Distributing cash through repurchases lowers agency

costs by forcing the company to rely more heavily on external funds.

Proposition 6:
Firms that appear undervalued relative to industry peers are motivated to
repurchase a greater percentage of their market capitalization through a tender
offer. A tender offer allows a firm to quickly repurchase a large percentage of
its stock, thus sending a powerful undervaluation signal to investors.

Proposition 7:
Firms that use little financial leverage relative to industry peers are able
to repurchase a greater percentage of their market capitalization through a
tender offer in order to take advantage of perceived undervaluation.

Proposition 8:
The perceived undervaluation motive to repurchase stock is stronger for
smaller firms because they are typically followed by fewer analysts, and
management is therefore more likely to believe the firm is undervalued.
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Limitations of the Study
This study excludes:
1. Foreign firms.
2. Firms in industries subject to significant regulation such as banking,
thrift, insurance, other financial services, and utilities.
3. Firms in industries that have fewer than five observations.
4. Firms that are not included on Value Line Investment Surveys
September 1997, compact disc or that have important missing
information.
5. Firms that are not included on Global Researcher's November 1997,
compact disc or that have important missing information.
6. Firms that are not on the Edgar website14 or that have important
missing information.

Plan of Study
Chapter 2 reviews the important historical research related to share
repurchases and is divided into five sections.

Section 1 reviews theories

justifying share repurchases. Section 2 discusses the work related to share
price behavior surrounding repurchase announcements. Section 3 summarizes
the work comparing repurchasing firms to non-repurchasing firms.

14 http://www.freeedgar.com/connpanies/index.htm.
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research related to repurchasing activity is reviewed in Section 4, and
conclusions are contained in Section 5.
Chapter 3 is divided into four sections.

In Section 1, propositions

related to open market repurchases are developed.

Likewise, Section 2

develops the tender offer repurchasing propositions. In Section 3, Proposition
8 argues that the perceived undervaluation motive is stronger for smaller firms.
Three censored regression models used to validate Propositions 1 through 8
are presented in Section 4.
Chapter 4 has three sections. Section 1 details the procedures followed
in constructing the sample of 1,598 firms. In Section 2, descriptive statistics
and the correlation matrix of important variables are presented and discussed.
Section 3 examines the regression results for the three models.
Chapter 5 is divided into two sections.

Section 1 reviews the eight

propositions and summarizes the evidence related to each proposition.
Section 2 points out limitations of this study and provides suggestions for future
research.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter reviews the existing body of literature related to share
repurchases. The focus of this chapter is to relate the existing literature to the
proposed factors that determine a company's repurchasing behavior.
The chapter contains five sections.

Section 1 reviews theoretical

justifications for share repurchases. Section 2 examines share price behavior
surrounding repurchase announcements.

Section 3 summarizes the work

comparing repurchasing firms to non-repurchasing firms. Section 4 covers
other research related to repurchases, and Section 5 contains conclusions.

Section 1: Theoretical Justification for
Share Repurchases
A brief listing and summary of the relevant research justifying share
repurchases is found in Exhibit 2-1 in the appendix.
Bierman and West (1966) examine the effects of share repurchases and
cash dividends on the value of the firm. They argue that the sole benefit of
distributing cash through a stock repurchase is a reduction of taxes for
shareholders.

The assumptions of their model are that investors have

homogeneous tax rates and tax bases, that investors know the breakdown

13
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between cash dividends and share repurchases, and that net income available
to common equity holders is a perpetuity. Bierman and West demonstrate that
if capital gains tax rates are lower than ordinary tax rates, the value of the firm
is maximized by distributing cash to shareholders solely through repurchases.
Elton and Gruber (1968) extend the work of Bierman and West (1966)
by first considering transaction costs in the model. The researchers point out
that the tax benefits of a repurchase can be offset by an increase in transaction
costs.

The implication is that some companies will find a cash dividend

strategy optimal, while others will find a stock repurchase strategy optimal.
Elton and Gruber also relax the assumption of homogeneous shareholders and
develop three implications. First, some shareholders will prefer cash dividends
and others will prefer repurchases due to differences in the cost basis of the
stock and marginal tax rates. Second, total transaction costs associated with
the repurchase will decrease because only shareholders selling stock will incur
brokerage commissions. Third, corporations do not have to force a blanket
cash flow policy on shareholders under a repurchase plan. Shareholders can
choose their personal cash flow pattern.
Vermaelen (1984) analyzes tender offers in a signaling framework. He
determines that management’s primary incentives for signaling the market are
to prevent takeovers and to increase the value of their stock options. The three
information factors that he derives and tests are the tender premium, the target
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fraction repurchased, and the amount of insider ownership. He finds that these
three factors are positively related to the firm’s announcement period return.
Ofer and Thakor (1987) develop a signaling model that applies to
relatively small firms whose management’s compensation varies directly with
the company’s stock price. The authors consider both share repurchases and
dividend increases as signaling devices available to management. They argue
that the market should respond more favorably to repurchase announcements
than dividend

increases

because false

signals

sent via

repurchase

announcements are shown to be more costly to management than false signals
sent through dividend increases. Their model also supports the notion of a
post-repurchase price decline.

Stock prices are shown to decrease at the

expiration of a tender offer because the firm is indirectly assessed exiting
shareholders’ transaction costs.
Bagnoli, Gordon, and Lipman (1989) develop a model in which
management uses share repurchases as a takeover defense. In their model,
management is concerned with both job security and maintaining the market
value of the firm. The repurchase announcement conveys the message that
management believes the share price is too low.

If management signals

falsely, the firm will overpay for repurchased shares and the value of the firm
will decrease.
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Talmor and Titman (1990) argue that cash distributions made through a
share repurchase program are preferred to dividend distributions, even if
capital gains are taxed at ordinary rates.

The main advantage of the

repurchase program is that participating shareholders are able to use the
stock’s basis to shelter some or all of the cash distribution from taxes. If the
firm instead distributed cash to shareholders through dividends, the entire
distribution would be taxed. However, the authors argue that if tax rates are
expected to increase, the stock’s basis deduction is more valuable in the future
and shareholders will prefer dividends to share repurchases in the current
period.
Hausch and Seward (1993) conclude that high-quality firms will
distinguish themselves from low-quality firms by repurchasing shares. False
signaling is discouraged by higher costs associated with the decision to
repurchase.
Persons (1994) develops a model of repurchasing shares through a
tender offer in which the firm chooses between either the Dutch auction method
or the fixed price method. The author concludes that the Dutch auction method
is a better takeover deterrent and that the fixed price method provides a more
powerful undervaluation signal.
Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1996) argue that an open market share
repurchase plan creates an option for the company.

The plan gives

management the option to enter the market whenever management believes
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the firm’s stock is undervalued. This theory relies on market inefficiency and
the ability of management to determine the "true” stock price. Ikenberry and
Vermaelen find that announcement period returns are positively related to the
volatility of the company’s stock price and the number of shares authorized for
repurchase, and negatively related to the correlation coefficient between the
company's stock return and the market’s return.19 The authors encourage
companies to initiate open market share repurchase plans in order to capitalize
on any possible future mispricing.
Persons (1997) develops a signaling model for tender offers that
incorporates heterogeneous shareholder reservation values. He argues that
firms must overpay on occasion for their shares because they face an upward
sloping supply curve, not a perfectly elastic one. He also concludes that tender
offers are used to signal large information asymmetries and dividends are used
to signal small ones.
In summary, distributing cash through repurchases would not affect the
value of the firm if markets were perfect and taxes were non-existent. Bierman
and West (1966) relax the no tax assumption and theorize that the only benefit
of repurchases over dividends is that repurchases are taxed at lower capital
gains rates. Vermaelen (1961 and 1984) and Dann (1981) conclude that

5 The correlation coefficient is a proxy for the relationship between the "true* value and market
value of the company's stock. Intuitively, if R-squared were one, the market return would fully
explain the firm's return and inside information would be useless. In this case, the option would
be worthless.
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repurchase announcements are generally used by firms as an undervaluation
signal.

Ofer and Thakor (1987), Hausch and Seward (1993), and Persons

(1994 and 1997) all rely on the existence of asymmetric information in justifying
repurchasing activity. Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1996) argue that signaling the
market is not the primary reason for many open market share repurchase
plans.

They believe that management benefits long-term shareholders by

purchasing shares in the market when the shares are undervalued.

Section 2: Repurchase Announcement
Effects on Share Prices
Section 2 is divided into two subsections. Subsection 2.1 reviews the
literature

on the effects

tender offer

and

open

market

repurchase

announcements have on share prices. Subsection 2.2 reviews the literature on
the effects targeted share repurchases (TSRs) have on share prices.

Subsection 2.1: Tender Offer and
Open Market Repurchases
The empirical research related to share price effects of repurchase
announcements is extensive.

A brief listing and summary of the relevant

articles is contained in Exhibit 2-2.1 in the appendix.
Stewart (1976) measures repurchasing activity by examining changes in
shares outstanding from one year to the next. Any company that repurchased
more than .25% of its stock is categorized as a repurchasing firm.

He

compares the indexed annual returns of repurchasing and non-repurchasing
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firms using the Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Rank Test.

He finds

repurchasing firms have discemibiy higher rates of return over both the threeand four-year periods following the repurchase. Stewart’s research supports
the contention that management is able to determine when the company’s
stock is undervalued and will repurchase it to increase shareholder returns.
The results imply that the market inefficiently factors repurchase information
into stock prices.
Masulis (1980) finds that stock prices of firms announcing a cash tender
offer increase an average of 16.35% over the two-day announcement period.
He attributes his findings in part to
1) a reduction in shareholders’ personal taxes by converting dividends
into capital gains,
2) a beneficial increase in financial leverage,
3) an expropriation of wealth from bondholders to shareholders, and
4) a wealth transfer from non-tendering to tendering shareholders due
to non-tendering shareholders’ relatively higher costs associated with
tendering.16
He also finds that on average only oversubscribed issues that are
purchased pro rata decline in price at the expiration date of the tender offer.

16If the tender price is greater than the true price, wealth will be transferred from non-tendering
to tendering shareholders. Shareholders with high tendering cost (reinvestment transaction
costs, high marginal tax rates, etc.) and significant tendering constraints wiN not claim their
share of this tender premium.
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An oversubscribed issue indicates that investors believe the offer is too
generous, and the expiration price typically drops if management announces a
pro rata repurchase. A positive signal is sent to the market if management
decides to repurchase all tendered shares, and the stock price typically does
not decline.
Dann (1981) investigates the expropriation hypothesis that says wealth
is transferred from

senior security

holders

to

shareholders

through

repurchases. He calculates the average rates of return for common stock as
well as for convertible and non-convertible preferred stocks and bonds. His
findings suggest that during the announcement period, non-tendering common
shareholder wealth increases by about 15%, and convertible security holder
wealth increases by about 3%.

Non-convertible security holder wealth is

insignificantly affected by the tender offer announcement. Dann concludes that
repurchases do not transfer wealth from bondholders to shareholders.
Vermaelen (1981) examines the share price behavior of firms that
repurchase their shares in the open market or via a tender offer.

He uses

event study methodology and finds that the average abnormal return for an
open market repurchase announcement is 3.62%. He also finds that tender
offer announcements deliver an average abnormal return of 13.9% during the
announcement period.

Vermaelen’s specific findings that support the

information-signaling hypothesis are as follows:
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1) He finds that 60% of the tender offer abnormal return variance is
explained by the size of the tender offer premium, level of insider
ownership, and the fraction repurchased. These three factors are all
positively related to the abnormal return and send positive signals to
the market.
2) Most of the firms repurchasing shares during the period 1962-1977
were small firms, which are typically followed by fewer analysts.
These firms are more likely than larger firms to have undervalued
shares and thus would have a greater need to use a tender offer.
3) If management uses repurchases to signal investors, then cash flow
per share would be expected to increase in subsequent years.
Earnings per share are used as a proxy for cash flow per share and
are found to be abnormally high for the years following a tender offer.
Barclay and Smith (1988) theorize that specialists increase a stock's bidask spread when management enters the market on behalf of the firm. The
increase in the spread decreases the liquidity of the stock and lowers its price.
The researchers use an event study design to test their theory and conclude
that

spreads

increase

discemibly

following

open

market

repurchase

announcements.
Contrary to Barclay and Smith (1988), Singh, Zaman, and Krishnamurti
(1994); Wiggins (1994); and Miller and McConnell (1995) all report no change
in bid-ask spreads subsequent to repurchase announcements. They use daily
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data, unlike Barclay and Smith who use annual data, and they find that the
percent spread (ratio of spread to stock price) increases in the pre
announcement period but not in the post-announcement period.

The pre-

announcement increase is attributable to a decline in the share price. They
find consistent results using both univariate and multivariate tests.
Natter and Mitchell (1989) analyze stock repurchase announcements in
the two weeks following the October 1987 stock market crash. They find that
firms that announced an open market repurchase plan earned an average
abnormal return of 3.45% during the announcement period.

They also

compare the post-announcement returns of firms that actually repurchased
shares to those firms that failed to repurchase shares. They find no evidence
that the market punishes firms that announce a repurchase and then fail to
actually repurchase shares. Their study supports the theory that repurchase
announcements convey management’s message that the company's stock is
undervalued.
Pugh and Jahera (1990) find a positive relationship between the tender
offer announcement period abnormal return and the change in the debt asset
ratio, holding other factors constant. This supports the leverage hypothesis
that says that tender offers move the firm toward their optimal capital structure.
The authors argue that tender offers transfer wealth from the government to
shareholders through tax reductions.
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Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1990) examine 221 tender offers that took
place in the 1962-1986 period. They employ a trading rule of purchasing a
tender firm's stock if it is less than or equal to 97% of the tender price,
tendering it, and selling any excess shares in the open market after expiration.
The results indicate an average risk-adjusted return of about 9% during an
investment period of less than thirty days. A possible reason for this anomaly
is that “repurchase tender offers are relatively rare events,” according to the
authors. They also calculate risk-adjusted returns for firms over the twenty-two
months following the tender offer.

During this period, small firms earn an

average excess return of 24%. This result is consistent with the hypothesis
that the market underestimates the information released in tender offers.
Therefore, they conclude that firm's employing a tender offer generally buy
undervalued shares.
Comment and Jarrell (1991) find that a Dutch auction tender offer is a
weaker signaling device than a fixed-price tender offer, and that large firms use
the Dutch auction method more frequently. The authors argue that large firms
are followed by more analysts and have a smaller chance of being
undervalued.

The researchers find that if insiders' wealth is at risk, higher

announcement period excess returns are generally earned.
Dann, Masulis, and Mayers (1991) test the hypothesis that management
uses tender offers to signal the market of forthcoming positive information.
Using two methods for predicting earnings, the researchers find that following
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tender offers, earnings are typically above predictions. There is also a positive
correlation between the announcement period abnormal return and the
prediction error of earnings.

They also discover that market risk generally

decreases for firms announcing tender offers. This change in risk is negatively
correlated with the announcement period abnormal return.
Banov’s (1991) study is similar to Dann, Masulis, and Mayer’s (1991)
study except that he analyzes earnings and risk changes of firms announcing
an open market repurchase instead of a tender offer repurchase. He finds that
earnings per share are generally higher than expected in the announcement
year and risk generally decreases following the announcement.

Also,

regression analysis indicates that announcement returns are positively
correlated with unexpected earnings and negatively correlated with risk
changes. Comparing the findings of Dann, Masulis, and Mayers to the findings
of Bartov, tender offers provide stronger evidence of earnings changes and a
larger

reduction

in

systematic

risk

than

open

market

repurchase

announcements. Both studies support the information-signaling hypothesis.
Brown & Ryngaert (1992) find that tendering rates are significantly
higher for inter-firm tender offers relative to self-tender offers. They argue that
accepting stock from another company is more costly than paying the capital
gains tax for many shareholders.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

25
Howe, He, and Kao (1992) find no evidence that Jensen’s free cash flow
theory explains the market reaction to announced tender offers or specially
designated dividends.

Low-Q (over-investing) firms are expected to have

higher announcement period returns than high-Q (under-investing) firms. They
are puzzled that the free cash flow theory was found by Lang and Litzenberger
(1989) to play an important role in dividend increases, but not in their study.
Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) perform a study similar to
Stewart (1976). They analyze 1,239 firms announcing an open market share
repurchase plan from 1980-1990. They find that these firms earn an average
abnormal

return

of

12.1%

over the

four-year

period

following

the

announcement. They also break the sample into five quintiles according to the
book-to-market ratio and find that firms in the highest quintile (value stocks)
averaged a 45.3% abnormal return over the four-year period following the
announcement.

No positive drift in prices is apparent for non-value stocks.

The researchers draw two main conclusions from their results:
1. Companies with high book-to-market value ratios are more likely to
repurchase stock due to undervaluation, and
2. The market inappropriately factors open market share repurchase
announcements into stock prices.
Ratner, Szewczyk, and Tsetsekos (1996) argue that institutional
investors are better informed than individual investors are, and as a company’s
institutional ownership increases, its stock price more accurately reflects all
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publicly and privately available information. The researchers find that a larger
tender offer announcement period abnormal return is associated with lower
levels of institutional ownership.
Chhachhi and Davidson (1997) find that companies announcing tender
offers typically have larger abnormal returns than companies announcing
specially designated dividends. One explanation for this is that shareholders
place a higher value on repurchases due to lower capital gains tax rates. The
researchers do find that the difference in the abnormal returns narrows
following the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
In summary, there is a strong body of empirical research that supports
the information-signaling motive for stock repurchases. Vermaelen (1981) and
Dann

(1981)

undervaluation

find

that

tender

signals than open

offer

announcements

send

stronger

market repurchase announcements.

According to Vermaelen (1981), firms announcing tender offers earn an
average abnormal return of 13.9% during the announcement period.

Firms

announcing an open market repurchase are typically characterized by negative
abnormal returns prior to the announcement and positive announcement period
abnormal returns that average 3.6%. Dann, Masulis, and Mayers (1991) and
Bartov (1991) find that firms announcing either type of repurchase program
have positive earnings surprises in subsequent years.

Stewart (1976) and

Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) find that the market tends to
underestimate the value of an open market repurchase announcement. They
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find that firms announcing open market repurchases earn positive abnormal
returns over the subsequent five-year period.

These results indicate that

tender offer and open market share repurchases increase shareholder wealth.

Subsection 2.2: Targeted Share
Repurchases (TSRs)
A listing of the relevant articles and their major findings is found in
Exhibit 2-2.2 in the appendix.
Bradley and Wakeman (1983) find that TSRs from insiders and small
investors typically benefit shareholders. The authors hypothesize that TSRs
involving insiders send positive signals to the market if insiders are perceived
as simply rebalancing their portfolio and if the company is perceived as
demonstrating confidence in the stock by buying it. The main benefit of TSRs
from small investors comes from a decrease in the total cost of mailing dividend
checks, quarterly reports, and other items to shareholders. The authors also
analyze block repurchases from single shareholders (often called “greenmail”)
and find that from event day -1 to 30, the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is
-3.8%.

Block repurchases that are associated with the end of a takeover

attempt elicit a drop of 12.5% in the share price. This finding suggests that
management is not acting in shareholders' best interest by repurchasing large
blocks of shares. Management appears to be eliminating competition for the
control of the firm’s assets by “buying out” large shareholders that have both
the power and incentive to discipline management.
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Dann and DeAngelo (1983) investigate the effects that standstill
agreements and TSRs have on non-participating shareholders.

During the

announcement period, they calculate that the mean share price reduction is
4.52% for companies with standstill agreements and 1.76% for companies with
TSRs.

These results cast doubt on whether management is acting in

shareholder’s best interest by negotiating standstill agreements and block
repurchases.
Holdemess and Sheehan (1985) investigate target companies’ returns
around large block purchases by six so-called "raiders” (Carl Icahn, Irwin
Jacobs, Carl Lindner, David Murdock, Victor Posner and Charles Bluhdom). A
subset of their sample includes TSRs of the raider's shares.

The authors

calculate the average abnormal return for target companies during the
purchase-to-repurchase period by summing the average abnormal return on
three significant event dates; the announcement day of the original block
purchase, the day that the raider demands repurchase, and the repurchase
announcement day.

The purchase-to-repurchase abnormal return is 3.2%.

Holdemess and Sheehan conclude that shareholders benefit from the initial
investment by the raider.
Klein and Rosenfeld (1988) analyze the share price behavior of target
firms during the purchase-to-repurchase period. Their study is similar to the
Holdemess and Sheehan (1985) study except they use a larger sample (77
verses 12).

Klein and Rosenfeld calculate a 6.45% abnormal return by
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summing the original purchase announcement period abnormal return and the
repurchase announcement period abnormal return.

However, a -3.27%

abnormal return occurs during the two-day repurchase announcement period.
Klein and Rosenfeld conclude that while the positive abnormal return during
the

purchase-to-repurchase

period

supports

the

shareholder

interest

hypothesis, the negative abnormal return during the repurchase announcement
period does not support it.
Klein and Rosenfeld (1988) study the turnover rates of companies
engaged in TSRs and find that these firms have above average management
turnover rates in the year following the repurchase. They argue that if the
repurchase were in shareholders' best interest, management turnover rates
would be insignificantly different from average turnover rates. They also find
that firms paying greenmail typically earn positive abnormal returns prior to a
change in management. This finding eliminates poor share price performance
as a motive for dismissal and places more emphasis on the greenmail
payment.
In summary, TSRs generally increase shareholder wealth during the
announcement period

if the

repurchase

is from

insiders

or

small

shareholders.17 Controversy exists over whether TSRs from large shareholders
is in a remaining shareholder's best interest. During the announcement period,

17 Bradley and Wakeman (1083).
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shareholder wealth decreases abnormally, however abnormal returns are
positive when calculated from the purchase-to-repurchase period.1* Klein and
Rosenfeld (1988) argue that since management turnover rates are higher than
normal following TSRs, shareholders must believe that TSRs do not maximize
shareholder wealth.

Section 3: Operating and Financial Characteristics
of Share Repurchasing Firms
Research on the important characteristics that differentiate repurchasing
firms from non-repurchasing firms is limited to four studies.

A listing and

summary of the four studies is found in Exhibit 2-3 in the appendix.
Young (1969) compares financial, operating, and security market
conditions of 227 firms that repurchased 1% or more common stock to a group
of similar firms that repurchased no common stock during any year between
1960-1967. He finds no distinct liquidity differences between the two groups,
but he does find that repurchasing firms typically use less financial leverage
and have greater debt service ability prior to the repurchase.

Young also

discovers that repurchasing firms have relatively lower total asset growth rates.
This finding suggests that they have relatively fewer investments, and
therefore, repurchase stock with their excess cash. Another distinct difference
between the two groups is in sales growth rates and operating income growth

18 Holdemess and Sheehan (1985) and Klein and Rosenfeld (1988).
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rates prior to and during the year of repurchase.

Repurchasing firms have

lower growth rates in sales and operating income, and Young suggests that
they are masking difficulties by repurchasing stock in hopes of maintaining
earnings per share. Alternatively, management may determine that the stock
price is low due to the poor operating results and may view this as an
opportunity to repurchase stock at a reduced price. Young also finds that
repurchasing firms have lower price/eamings ratios both before and after the
repurchase, reinforcing his idea that the firm is repurchasing stock at reduced
prices.
Norgaard and Norgaard (1974) define a repurchasing firm as holding 8%
or more of its outstanding stock in the treasury, and a non-repurchasing firm as
holding no treasury stock. Their sample includes sixty repurchasing firms and
sixty non-repurchasing firms.

They first compare the means of various

operating and financial ratios of repurchasing firms to non-repurchasing firms.
Repurchasing firms have lower price/eamings ratios, higher book-to-market
ratios, and higher dividend yields. Repurchasing firms also hold less cash but
have higher inventory and/or receivables balances.

Unlike Young (1969),

Norgaard and Norgaard find that repurchasing firms use more debt than nonrepurchasing firms. They conclude that repurchasing companies are inferior to
non-repurchasing companies and advise "financial managers to reexamine
their actions or contemplated actions in repurchasing in light of both theory and
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practice.” Norgaard and Norgaard also use discriminant function analysis and
find that the companies can be divided into two distinct groups.
Finnerty (1975) identifies the primary characteristics that distinguish
equity repurchasing companies from equity issuing companies. He uses both
univariate and multivariate models and has a final sample size of 715 firms that
issued or repurchased equity in 1972. He concludes that firms issuing equity
generally have more financial leverage and lower dividends than firms
repurchasing stock.

These results suggest that repurchasing firms have

relatively fewer investments. Finnerty also uses factor analysis and concludes
that the firms come from distinct groups.
Medury, Bowyer, and Srinivasan (1992) use both univariate and
multivariate models to compare repurchasing firms, non-repurchasing firms,
open market repurchasing firms, and tender offer repurchasing firms.
Repurchasing firms are classified as announcing a repurchase program
between 1983-1986.

The researchers find that repurchasing firms use

relatively less financial leverage, have less liquidity, have higher dividend
yields, and have higher profitability ratios. Firms that announce a tender offer,
relative to firms announcing an open market repurchase, are smaller in terms of
sales, number of shares outstanding, and total assets. The researchers use a
multiple discriminant model that indicates that the firms can be accurately
classified.
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In summary, there is general agreement that repurchasing and non
repurchasing firms have significantly different financial and operating
characteristics. The studies generally characterize repurchasing firms as using
less financial leverage19 and having lower stock prices20 than non-repurchasing
firms.

Section 4: Other Research
A listing and summary of other research related to share repurchases is
found in Exhibit 2-4 in the appendix.
Austin (1969) looks at the repurchasing activity over the 1961-1967
period. He finds that
1) the number of times a repurchasing company entered the market to
repurchase shares ranged from 1 to 68 times,
2) the percentage of total shares that were repurchased varied from 1%
to 85%, and
3) the main reasons for repurchase were to provide shares for stock
option programs and to avoid takeovers.
Baker, Gallagher, and Morgan (1981) survey chief financial officers
(CFOs) and find that the two most common reasons for repurchasing stock are
for investment purposes and to acquire shares for employee bonuses and/or

19Young (1969); Finnerty (1975); and Medury, Bowyer, and Srinivasan (1992).
20 Young (1969); Norgaaid and Norgaard (1974); and Medury, Bowyer, and Srinivasan (1992).
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stock options. Many of the CFOs view share repurchases as detrimental to the
firm’s capital structure and do not view them as substitutes for dividends.
Wansley, Lane, and Sarkar's (1989) survey results indicate that
management’s primary reason for repurchasing stock is undervaluation.
Managers also believe premiums increase 1) as management's confidence in
future earnings increase, 2) as the fraction of shares repurchased increase, 3)
when debt is used to repurchase the shares, and 4) when the repurchase is in
response to a takeover attempt.
Gay, Kale, and Noe (1989) show that repurchasing shares by issuing
transferable put rights (TPRs) ensures that shareholders with the lowest
reservation prices tender their shares first.

This leads to maximum tax

efficiency and decreases the probability of a takeover by eliminating
shareholders with the lowest reservation prices.
Gay, Kale, and Noe (1991) use a Monte Carlo simulation to compare two
relatively new stock repurchase methods (Dutch auction and TPRs) to the
traditional fixed-price tender offer, assuming heterogeneous shareholders.
They find that Dutch auctions and TPRs are more efficient than fixed-price
tender offers. An efficient repurchase is defined as one where all remaining
shareholders place a higher value on the firm than the tendering shareholders.
Dutch auctions and TPRs do a better job of maximizing the value of the firm
than fixed-price tender offers. The researchers also show that Dutch auctions
are the best repurchasing method to deter takeovers.
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Gay, Kale and Noe (1996) develop and test two models dealing with
heterogeneous shareholders involved in a Dutch auction repurchase.

They

predict and find evidence indicating that tender offer premiums are negatively
related to the level of bidding competition and that tender offer premiums
increase as the number of shares sought increases.
Bagwell and Shoven (1989) highlight the tax advantage of share
repurchases and acquisitions over cash dividend disbursements.

They

accumulate the total amount of dollars spent on acquisitions, dividends, and
share repurchases from 1977-1987. The real growth rates for the entire tenyear period in dollars distributed through acquisitions, share repurchases, and
dividends were 900%, 824%, and 61.3%, respectively.

There was a sharp

decrease in repurchases during the first quarter of 1987 that is possibly
attributable to the narrowing of the gap between capital gains tax rates and
ordinary tax rates resulting from the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Also, Casey,
Anderson, Mesak, and Dickens (1997) find evidence that companies in certain
industries changed their dividend payout ratios as a result of the Tax Reform
Act of 1986.
Denis (1990) investigates target firms that pay out cash to shareholders
through a special dividend or a share repurchase as a means of defense. The
announcement of a share repurchase is associated with a negative abnormal
return, and the announcement of a special dividend is associated with a
positive abnormal return.

Firms remaining independent, generally have
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positive CARs during the contest period regardless of the defensive payout
method used. Firms that maintain their independence undergo msyor changes
in capital, asset, and ownership structures in the year following the takeover
contest.
Cole, Helwege, and Laster (1996) adjust the dividend yield for share
repurchases and find that it is currently low by historical standards. They note
that low dividend yields have historically been associated with lackluster
returns in the stock market, and they predict lackluster stock returns based on
this measure.

Section 5: Conclusions
Share repurchasing can be used for many reasons such as altering a
firm’s capital structure or signaling the market of undervaluation.

The

consensus view in the literature is that tender offers are used as a signaling
device.

Management signals the market in order to increase shareholder

wealth.
Unlike tender offers, there is a lack of consensus as to the primary
reason(s) for open market repurchases.

Ikenberry, Lakonishok,

and

Vermaelen (1995) suggest that large firms use an open market repurchase
plan to restructure and that small firms use it as a signaling device. Ikenberry
and Vermaelen (1996) argue that open market repurchase plans are instituted

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

37
in order to give companies the option to repurchase stock whenever
management believes it is undervalued.
Some of the important characteristics of repurchasing firms relative to
non-repurchasing firms differ depending on either the time period analyzed
and/or the definitions used for repurchasing and non-repurchasing firms. For
instance, Norgaard and Norgaard (1974) find that repurchasing firms are
relatively less profitable, while Medury, Bowyer, and Srinivasan (1992) find that
repurchasing firms are relatively more profitable.
Much of the empirical work in the 1980s supports the informationsignaling hypothesis, especially for tender offers.

However, Ikenberry and

Vermaelen (1996) argue that signaling the market is not the primary motivation
for open market repurchases.

The present study identifies and empirically

tests the important factors that influence a firm’s repurchasing activity.
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CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY OF PROPOSITIONS’
VALIDATION
Share repurchase activity varies widely among firms. In this study, a
firm’s repurchase activity is measured by the amount of cash distributed to
shareholders through share repurchases expressed as a percentage of the
firm's average market capitalization (RCAP). Market capitalization equals the
number of shares outstanding multiplied by the firm’s share price. Section 1 of
this chapter discusses factors that motivate firms to repurchase shares through
the open market.
In Section 2 of this chapter, two motivations for repurchasing stock
through a tender offer are discussed. Prior research indicates that the primary
motivation for repurchasing shares through a tender offer is perceived
undervaluation, however, this study proposes that financial leverage plays an
important role in determining the size of the tender offer. For example, a firm
that perceives substantial undervaluation will not be able to use a tender offer
unless it has excess debt capacity.
Prior research indicates that the perceived undervaluation motive is
stronger for smaller firms, and in Section 3 this motivation is discussed in

38
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detail. Three censored regression models are presented in Section 4 for the
purpose of validating the developed propositions.

Section 1: Propositions Related to
Ooen Market Repurchases
The basic elements of the Open Market Repurchase Model are
perceived undervaluation, financial leverage, cash inflows, investment cash
outflows, and the dispersion of ownership.

The Open Market Repurchase

Model (Equations 1-a and 1-b on page 50) is presented in Section 4 of this
chapter and is used to test Propositions 1 through 5.

Proposition 1:
Firms that appear undervalued relative to industry peers are motivated to
repurchase a greater percentage o f their market capitalization in the open
market in order to benefit long-term shareholders.
In a survey by Wansley, Lane, and Sarkar (1989), management
indicates that undervaluation is an important motivation for repurchasing
shares.

If management believes the company’s stock is undervalued,

repurchasing it makes sense. If management is correct, the repurchase will
benefit long-term shareholders.
The price-to-book value ratio is used as a proxy for undervaluation and
is measured at the beginning of each firm’s fiscal year. A repurchase often
sends a positive signal to investors, who typically respond by increasing the
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firm’s price and therefore cause the price-to-book value ratio to increase. The
repurchase reduces or eliminates any undervaluation. Measuring the price-tobook value ratio at the beginning of the year eliminates the positive feedback
effect that repurchases have on the price-to-book value ratio.
Industry characteristics influence a firm’s price-to-book value ratio. For
example, firms in the computer software service industry typically have
significantly higher price-to-book value ratios than firms in the auto
manufacturing industry. Much of this difference is due to software service firms
having substantially more human assets than the auto manufacturers, and
these human assets do not increase a firm’s book value. If industry effects are
not controlled, auto manufacturers will typically look undervalued relative to
software service firms. In order to control for industry effects, each firm’s priceto-book value ratio is normalized by subtracting the industry’s estimated mean
and dividing by the industry's estimated standard deviation.

Controlling for

industry effects allows a firm to appear undervalued or overvalued relative to
industry peers. The normalized price-to-book value ratio (PBN) included in the
Open Market Repurchase Model is expected to negatively impact RCAP.

Proposition 2:
Firms that use little financial leverage relative to industry peers are
motivated to repurchase a greater percentage of their market capitalization in
the open market in order to move the firm closer to its optimal capital structure.
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The trade-off model suggests that as debt is added to the capital
structure, the value of the firm increases up to a point and then decreases
beyond that point.21 As the model suggests, the main advantage of debt is its
tax deductibility, and the main disadvantages of debt are agency and financial
distress costs.

In theory, a firm’s optimal capital structure is the one that

balances the marginal benefit of debt with the marginal cost of debt Firms with
low debt-to-asset ratios are expected to benefit from more debt and/or less
equity in their capital structures. One way for a firm to increase the relative
amount of debt is to repurchase stock.
The proxy for the financial leverage motive is a firm’s debt-to-asset ratio
measured at the beginning of each firm’s fiscal year. Measuring this ratio at
the beginning of the year is necessary because stock repurchases have an
impact on financial leverage. A firm repurchasing stock in order to increase its
financial leverage will not appear as under-leveraged after the repurchase.
Therefore, measuring the debt-to-asset ratio at the beginning of the year
eliminates the feedback effect the repurchase has on the debt-to-asset ratio.
Industry characteristics influence the amount of financial leverage a firm
can employ.

For example, firms in industries that have a large amount of

operating risk (durable goods manufacturers) will generally use less debt than
firms in industries that have little operating risk (utility companies). In order to

21 See Brigham and Gapenski (pp. 636-640) for a more complete discussion of the trade-off
model.
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account for industry effects, a firm's debt-to-asset ratio is normalized by
subtracting the industry's estimated mean and dividing by the industry's
estimated standard deviation.

The normalized debt-to-asset ratio (DN)

included in the Open Market Repurchase Model is expected to negatively
impact RCAP.

Proposition 3:
Firms that have high cash inflows relative to industry peers are motivated
to repurchase a greater percentage o f their market capitalization in the open
market The larger a firm's cash inflows, the greater tee need to distribute cash
to shareholders, holding other factors constant.
One of the benefits of distributing cash to shareholders through a
repurchase is that only shareholders desiring current income receive cash and
pay taxes. Alternatively, a dividend forces cash, taxes, and transaction costs
on shareholders that do not desire a cash distribution. Furthermore, dividends
are taxed at ordinary rates, and repurchases are taxed at potentially lower
capital gains rates.

Therefore, companies with higher cash inflows are

expected to distribute more cash to shareholders through open market
repurchases.
The cash flow-to-total asset ratio is used as a proxy for a firm’s relative
cash inflows. Cash flows are defined as net income plus non-cash expenses.
This variable is normalized by subtracting the industry's estimated mean and
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dividing by the industry's estimated standard deviation.

The normalization

process controls for industry effects. The normalized cash flow-to-total asset
ratio (CFN) included in the Open Market Repurchase Model is expected to
positively impact RCAP.

Proposition 4:
Firms that have tower investment cash outflows are motivated to
repurchase a larger percentage of their market capitalization in the open
market The smaller the Arm's investment cash outflows, the greater the need
to distribute cash to shareholders, holding other factors constant.
Higher growth firms need cash to finance asset acquisitions, and
internally generated cash is a cheaper source of financing than externally
generated cash due to floatation costs.

Donaldson’s (1961) survey of

corporations suggests that internally generated cash is the preferred means for
financing new projects.

The firm's compound annual growth rate in sales

calculated over the preceding five-year period is employed to measure a firm’s
historical and future investment cash outflows. High historical growth rates
indicate less cash was available for repurchasing stock and if past growth rates
are good predictors of future growth rates, imply cash will be retained in order
to finance future growth.

The compound annual growth rate in sales (G)

included in the Open Market Repurchase Model is expected to negatively
impact RCAP.
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Proposition 5:
Finns that have mom diverse ownership structures will repurchase a
larger percentage of their market capitalization in the open market in order to
reduce agency costs. Distributing cash through repurchases lowers agency
costs by forcing the company to rely mom heavily on external financing.
Proposition 5 addresses the agency conflict between shareholders and
management. The proxy for the diversity of Ownership is a firm’s book value of
total assets measured at the end of each firm’s fiscal year.

Larger firms

typically have more owners and thus higher agency costs. Distributing cash to
shareholders through repurchases forces firms to go to capital markets more
frequently, and thus undergo the scrutiny of investment bankers and
prospective investors. Rozeff (1982) finds that the number of shareholders
positively impacts the dividend payout ratio.22 The natural log of total assets
(LTA) included in the Open Market Repurchase Model is expected to positively
impact RCAP.

22 Rozeff uses the total number of shareholders to proxy for the dispersion of ownership in his
study. Total assets is used here instead of the total number of shareholders because of fewer
missing data points. The two variables are highly correlated though (.71).
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Section 2: Propositions Related to
Tender Offer Repurchases
Eleven of the 1,598 firms in the sample used a tender offer to
repurchase shares during the fiscal year. One alternative for dealing with the
limited number of tender offer observations is to include a slope dummy
variable and intercept dummy variables representing tender offer firms in the
Open Market Repurchase Model. However, in order to do this, one has to
assume that the error variances for tender offer repurchasing firms and open
market repurchasing firms are equal. This assumption is not reasonable. The
dependent variable in the Open Market Repurchase Model, RCAP, has a
standard deviation for tender offer repurchasing firms that is over eleven times
greater than the standard deviation of RCAP for open market repurchasing
firms. Therefore, a separate censored regression model is set up for tender
offer firms. The Tender Offer Repurchase Model (Equations 2-a and 2-b on
page 50) is presented in Section 4 and is used to test Propositions 6 and 7.

Proposition 6:
Firms that appear undervalued relative to industry peers are motivated to
repurchase a greater percentage of their market capitalization through a tender
offer. A tender offer allows a firm to quickly repurchase a large percentage of
its stock, thus sending a powerful undervaluation signal to investors.
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Firms will likely prefer a tender offer to an open market repurchase if the
firm’s stock is perceived by management to be substantially undervalued
because a tender offer allows the company to rapidly repurchase a large
quantity of stock. Ikenberry (1980) finds that tender offer announcements send
a much stronger undervaluation signal to investors than open market
repurchase announcements. Firms repurchasing through a tender offer pay an
average premium of 22% and thus are thought to be undervalued by at least
the amount of the premium.

The price-to-book value ratio normalized by

industry (PBN) is included in the Tender Offer Repurchase Model and is
expected to negatively impact RCAP.

Proposition 7:
Firms that use little financial leverage relative to industry peers are able
to repurchase a greater percentage of their market capitalization through a
tender offer in order to take advantage of perceived undervaluation.
Firms repurchasing through a tender offer typically buy back about 15%
of their equity. This large equity repurchase substantially changes the firm’s
capital structure.

Managers believing that the firm has too little debt can

rapidly increase financial leverage by using a tender offer repurchase.
However, it is doubtful that the benefit of more financial leverage will offset the
large tender offer premium. Therefore, it is likely that perceived undervaluation
is the primary motivation for a tender offer and that excess debt capacity
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impacts the size of repurchase. The debt-to-asset ratio normalized by industry
(ON) is included in the Tender Offer Repurchase Model and is expected to
negatively impact RCAP.23

Section 3: Small Firms and the
Undervaluation Motive
The basic elements of the Small Firm Undervaluation Model are
perceived undervaluation, financial leverage, cash inflows, investment cash
outflows, and the dispersion of ownership. This model differs from the Open
Market Repurchase Model in that an interaction term between firm size and
perceived undervaluation is included. The Small Firm Undervaluation Model
(Equations 3-a on page 50 and 3-b on page 51) is presented in Section 4 of
this chapter and is used to test Propositions 8.

Proposition 8:
The undervaluation motive to repurchase stock is stronger for smaller
firms because they are typically followed by fewer analysts and management is
therefore more likely to believe the firm is undervalued.
Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen’s (1995) findings suggest that
smaller firms are motivated to repurchase stock due to undervaluation.
Specifically, they find that small firms had significantly higher abnormal returns

23 The cash inflow, investment cash outflow, and agency cost motives are not expected to
motivate Anns to distribute cash to shareholdere through a tender offer because a dividend
distribution is more efficient. The large tender offer premium is expected to outweigh any
benefits derived from these three motivations.
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than large firms over a four-year period following an open market repurchase
announcement.

They conclude that a strong motivation for announcing a

repurchase program for small firms is undervaluation.
In order to account for the possibility that smaller firms are more inclined
than larger firms to repurchase stock due to perceived undervaluation,
interaction terms between a firm’s PBN and its total asset quartile are included
as explanatory variables in the Small Firm Undervaluation Model presented in
Section 4. Size quartiles are constructed by sorting firms according to total
assets and then placing them in one of four total asset quartiles. TA2 is a
dummy variable coded one if the firm is in the second total asset quartile and
zero otherwise. TA3 (TA4) is a dummy variable coded one if the firm is in the
third (fourth) total asset quartile and zero otherwise. In equation 3-b shown on
page 51, 04 represents the expected change in RCAP resulting from a one
standard deviation change in PBN for firms in total asset quartile one.

fc

represents the difference in the marginal impact of PBN between firms in total
asset quartiles one and two. 0t (07) represents the difference in the marginal
impact of PBN between firms in total asset quartiles one and three (one and
four).

If smaller firms have a greater tendency to repurchase stock due to

perceived undervaluation, 07 > 0« > 0s > 0.
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Section 4: The Repurchase Models
RCAP is a censored variable because the repurchase expenditure
cannot fall below zero and thus does not adequately measure a non
repurchasing firm’s aversion to repurchasing shares.

It may be argued that

firms show their aversion to repurchases by issuing equity, however this will not
always be the case.

For example, suppose a non-repurchasing firm has

excess liquidity and a relatively high debt-to-asset ratio. This firm is unlikely to
show its aversion to repurchases by issuing equity because this would increase
the firm’s liquidity. This firm is more likely to distribute cash to debtors and thus
hide its level of aversion to share repurchases.
Share repurchasing activity is measured by the amount of cash
distributed to shareholders through share repurchases expressed as a
percentage of the firm’s average annual market capitalization (RCAP). Simply
regressing RCAP on a set of explanatory variables is inappropriate because
the coefficient estimates would be biased and inconsistent due to bias in the
error term. Heckman (1979) proposes a simple two-stage estimation process
that generates consistent coefficient estimates.

In the first stage, a probit

model is utilized in order to estimate a hazard rate, A*, for each firm . 24 In the
second stage, K is added to the regression model as an explanatory variable in

24 X* is a measure of the likelihood that firm i repurchases stock. Specifically, h «
f(a+pXj)/F(a+pXj).
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order to normalize the mean of the error to zero, thus generating consistent
estimates of the coefficient parameters. Three censored regression models are
presented below.

Open Market Repurchase Model
Staoe 1 Probit Model
P i= F (Zj) = F (ao + ctiPBNi + agDNi + otaCFNi ♦ ouGi + aaLTAt)

(1 -a)

Staoe 2 Regression Model
RCAP. = 30 + 31 PBNi + 02DNi + 03CFNi + 04Gi + 05LTAi + 06* i + u,

(1 -b)

Tender Offer Repurchase Model
Staoe 1 Probit Model
Pi = F (Zi) = F (geo + aiPBNi + 012DN 1)

(2-a)

Stage 2 Regression Model
RCAPi = 0o + 0iPBNi ♦ 02DNi ♦ 0 )1 1♦ U\

(2-b)

Small Firm Undervaluation Model
Stage 1 Probit Model
Pi = F (Zi) = F (oto

ciiTA2i ♦ a 2TA3i + ajTA4t + ouPBNi +

a«(PBN,*TA2,) + a«(PBNfTA3,) + a7(PBN,TA4l) ♦ a«DN, +
a«CFNi + aioGi)
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Staoe 2 Regression Model
RCAP, = po + 0,TA2, + 02TA3. + fc T M ♦ P4PBN, + 0$(PBN,*TA2i) +
W PBN.TA3,) + Pt(PBN,-TM ) ♦ 0«ON, + 0.CFN, ♦ 01OG, +
Pu ii + Ui

@"b)

where,
P, = Estimate of the conditional probability that firm i will
repurchase stock given PBN, ON, CFN, G, and LTA (Open
Market Repurchase Model); PBN and DN (Tender Offer
Repurchase Model); and TA2, TA3, TA4, PBN, PBN*TA2,
PBN*TA3, PBN*TA4, DN, CFN, and G (Small Firm
Undervaluation Model).
F = Cumulative normal probability function.
Zi = A continuous index number determined from firm i's PBN,
DN, CFN, G, and LTA (Open Market Repurchase Model);
PBN and DN (Tender Offer Repurchase Model); and TA2,
TA3, TA4, PBN, PBN*TA2, PBNTA3, PBNTA4, DN, CFN,
and G (Small Firm Undervaluation Model).
PBNi = Firm i’s beginning of the year price-to-book value ratio
normalized by subtracting the industry's estimated mean
and dividing by the industry's estimated standard deviation.
DNi = Firm i’s beginning of the year total debt-to-asset ratio
normalized by subtracting the industry's estimated mean
and dividing by the industry’s estimated standard deviation.
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CFNi

= Finn i’s cash flow-to-total asset ratio normalized

by

subtracting the industry’s estimated mean and dividing by
the industry's estimated standard deviation.
Gi = Firm i’s compound annual growth rate in sales calculated
over the preceding five-year period using the average to
average method.29
LTAi

= The natural log of firm i’s book value of total assets
measured at the end of the fiscal year.

RCAPi = The amount of cash distributed to shareholders through
share repurchases expressed as a percentage of the firm’s
average annual market capitalization.
PBN i*TA2 i

= An interaction term between PBN and TA2.

TA2 is a

dummy variable coded one if the firm is in the second total
asset quartile and zero otherwise.

Total assets are

measured at the end of the year.
PBNt*TA3,

= An interaction term between PBN and TA3.

TA3 is a

dummy variable coded one if the firm is in the third total
asset quartile and zero otherwise.

Total assets are

measured at the end of the year.
PBN|*TA4(

= An interaction term between PBN and TA4.

TA4 is a

dummy variable coded one if the firm is in the highest total
asset quartile and zero otherwise.

Total assets are

measured at the end of the year.
ai

= Firm i’s hazard rate, estimated from the Stage 1 Probit
Model. This variable normalizes the mean of U\ to zero.

Ui = The error term distributed as N (0, o2).
25 The compound annual rates of change are calculated using three-year base periods. Base
periods used for the 1996 sales growth rate calculation are 1989-1991 and 1994-1996. Value
Line Investment Survey calculates and reports this growth rate.
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The Stage 1 Probit Model assumes that there is a theoretical continuous
variable Z, which is a

linear function of the explanatory variables.

Observations on Z are not available, but high Z-values are associated with
repurchasing firms, and low Z-values are associated with non-repurchasing
firms. Zi represents the strength of appeal of a repurchase for firm i. Maximum
likelihood estimation is used to estimate the coefficients of the explanatory
variables, and the probability that firm i repurchases stock through the open
market is directly related to Z>. Specifically, the probability is measured by the
area under the standard normal curve from -oo to Zi.
The Stage 1 probit model and the Stage 2 regression model can be
estimated independently or jointly. Joint estimation is accomplished by using
the “Sampser command in TSP International Version 4.4. The method used is
the maximization of the likelihood function. Joint estimation using the maximum
likelihood function yields more efficient estimates. Joint estimation is used for
the Open Market Repurchase Model and the Small Firm Undervaluation Model.
The Tender Offer Repurchase Model equations are estimated independently
because of a limited number of tender offer repurchasing firms.
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CHAPTER 4

DATA AND EMIPIRCAL FINDINGS
Chapter 4 is divided into three sections.

Section 1 details the

procedures followed in constructing the sample of 1,598 firms. In Section 2,
descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix for important variables are
presented and discussed. Section 3 presents the regression results for the
three models and examines the resulting implications.

Section 1: Data
The final sample includes 1,598 firms and spans 62 industries as
classified by Value Line Investment Survey.

Table 4-1 lists the industries

represented, the number of firms within each industry, the number of firms
within each industry that repurchased stock, and the percentage of firms within
each industry that repurchased stock. The largest industry represented in the
sample is the medical supply industry, and it accounts for 5.4% of the total
sample.

54
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Table 4-1: Industries Represented in the Sample
The industries included in the final sample of 1,598 firms are listed in
descending order according to the number of firms within each industry. For
example, 87 firms in the medical supply industry are included in the sample
and 32 of them (36.78%) repurchased stock during their fiscal year ending
between 3-31-96 and 4-1-97.

Industry
Medical Supplies
Software
Retail (Special Lines)
Electronics
Machinery
Drug
Computers
Chemical (Specialty)
Diversified
Industrial Services
Instrument
Medical Services
Petroleum (Producing)
Food Processors
Environment
Electrical Equipment
Telecommunications
Equipment
Restaurant
Natural Gas (Distributors)
Recreation
T elecommunications
Services
Semiconductor
Oilfield
Homebuilding
Natural Gas (Diversified)
Paper & Forest Products
Metal Fabrication
Apparel

Number
of Firms
87
71
69
67

Number of
Repurchasing
Firms
32
28
23
19
25
15
14
32
29
18
15
4

14

Percent of Industry
that Repurchased
36.78%
39.44%
33.33%
28.36%
37.88%
23.81%
24.56%
61.54%
56.86%
37.50%
35.71%
9.52%
33.33%
38.24%
18.18%
43.75%

32
31
30
30

4
9
7
9

12.50%
29.03%
23.33%
30.00%

30
27
26
25
24
24

10
11

33.33%
40.74%
26.92%
28.00%
33.33%
54.17%
33.33%
45.00%

66
63
57
52
51
48
42
42
36
34
33
32

21
20

12
13

6

7
7

8
13
7
9
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Petroleum (Integrated)
Retail Store
Trucking
Publishing
Steel
Aerospace/Defense
Entertainment
Gold/Silver Mining
Office Equipment &
Supplies
Building Materials
Hotel/Gaming
Packaging & Container
Textile
Chemical (Diversified)
Grocery
Newspaper
Auto Parts (Replacement)
Furniture
Manufactured Housing /
Recreational Vehicles
Cement
Air Transport
Household Products
Auto Parts (OEM)
Chemical (Basic)
Shoe
Cosmetics
Maritime
Appliance
Building Supplies
Beverage (Soft Drink)
Mining
Semiconductor Equipment
Advertising
Auto & Truck
Average

20
20
20
19
19
17
16
16
16
15
15
15
15
14
14
14
13
13

11
6
9
13
7
5

11
0
6
7

6
6
7

11
10
11
3

12

13

6

12
11
11
10
10
10

5
3
7
4
3
5

9
9
7
7

6

6
6
6
5
5
25.77

4
3
3
4

2
4
4
3
9.79
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55.00%
30.00%
45.00%
68.42%
36.84%
29.41%
68.75%
0 .00%
37.50%
46.67%
40.00%
40.00%
46.67%
78.57%
71.43%
78.57%
23.08%
92.31%
46.15%
41.67%
27.27%
63.64%
40.00%
30.00%
50.00%
66.67%
44.44%
42.86%
42.86%
66.67%
33.33%
66.67%
80.00%
60.00%
42.56%

A three-step process was followed in order to arrive at the final sample
of 1,596 firms.
Step 1: The filter presented in Table 4-2 was applied to Value Line Investment
Surveys September 1997, compact disc. There were 624 foreign
firms that were eliminated because foreign firms are often prohibited
from repurchasing shares.

Seven hundred and forty-one firms in

industries that face regulatory constraints on equity were also
eliminated.

Two hundred and five firms were eliminated because

their fiscal year end did not fall in the period between March 31, 1996
and April 1,1997. There were 1,416 firms that did not have five-year
sales growth rates.

Lastly, 144 firms with negative equity were

discarded because the price-to-book value ratio is meaningless when
a firm has negative equity.
Step 2: Global Researcher's November 1997, compact disc was used to obtain
the prior year's debt-to-asset ratio and price-to-book value ratio for
the remaining firms. Two hundred and nine firms were eliminated due
to missing data or unmatched ticker symbols.
Step 3: The 10-Ks of the 1,844 remaining firms were examined on the
FreeEdgar website in order to obtain the amount of cash distributed
through stock repurchases.

Two hundred and forty-six firms were

eliminated for various reasons such as an unmatched ticker symbol,
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Table 4-2: Value Line Filter
The following filter was applied to Value Line Investment Survey's September
1997, compact disc. There are 5,183 observations on the disc, and 2,053
passed the filter.
R eid Name
US domicile code
Industry
Industry
Industry
Industry
Industry
Industry
Industry
Industry
Industry
Industry
Industry
Industry
Industry
FY End
FY End
5-Year Sales Growth
Price-to-Book Value

Value

Logic
Include
Exclude
Exclude
Exclude
Exclude
Exclude
Exclude
Exclude
Exclude
Exclude
Exclude
Exclude
Exclude
Exclude
>s
<s

>
>

US
Bank
Brokers
Insurance - Divers.
Insurance - Life
Insurance - Property
Fund USA
Fund FGN
Fund Income
R.E.I.T.
Thrift
Utility Central
Utility East
Utility West
1996-04-01
1997-03-31
-999 (in percent)

0

#
Passed
4.559
4,334
4,306
4.256
4.222
4.157
4.142
4.121
4.109
4.013
3.917
3,876
3.836
3.818
3,779
3.613
2,197
2,053

a missing statement of cash flows, or a net amount reported for the
issue (repurchase) of equity.
Eleven of the 607 repurchasing firms used a tender offer. These firms
were identified by searching the Edgar website for SC 13E-4 filings.

The

Securities and Exchange Commission requires that all firms pursuing a tender
offer submit this form. The form gives specifics on the tender offer.
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Section 2: Descriptive Statistics
Panel A of Table 4-3 presents descriptive statistics for several variables
of interest. The average firm distributed 1.20% of its average annual market
capitalization in cash to shareholders through stock repurchases.3*

This

compares to 1.02% of market capitalization distributed to shareholders through
dividends. Also, 37.92% of the firms in the sample repurchased stock versus
46.68% that paid dividends. The 1,598 firms distributed about $52.86 billion
through repurchases and about $63.55 billion through dividends during the
fiscal period.37 These findings support the notion that repurchasing stock is an
important means of distributing cash to shareholders for many firms.
The volatility of RCAP is 2.69 times greater than the volatility of the
dividend-to-market capitalization ratio (DCAP). This suggests that some firms
distribute relatively large sums of cash through repurchases while others
distribute relatively small sums of cash through repurchases, if any. A possible
explanation for this finding is that firms initially pay a fixed dividend and then
use any excess liquidity to repurchase stock.

20 If the 11 tender offer repurchasing firms are excluded, the mean and standard deviation of
RCAP are 1.036 and 2.65.
37 The fact that the average firm distributes more of its market capitalization through
repurchases than through dividends, but that more dollars are distributed through dividends
than through repurchases indicates that small firms typically repurchase more of their market
capitalization than large firms.
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Table 4-3: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix
The following table provides summary statistics and the correlation matrix for a
cross-sectional sample of 1,598 firms spanning 62 industries based on a firm’s
fiscal year ending between 3-31-96 and 4-1-97. Panel A reports descriptive
statistics for the repurchase-to-market capitalization ratio (RCAP), dividend-tomarket capitalization ratio (DCAP), price-to-book value ratio (PB), debt-to-asset
ratio (D), cash flow-to-total asset ratio (CF), five-year compound annual growth
rate in sales (G ), and total assets (TA). Panel B reports the correlation matrix
for RCAP, DCAP, PBN (price-to-book value ratio normalized by industry), DN
(debt-to-asset ratio normalized by industry), CFN (cash flow-to-total asset ratio
normalized by industry), G, and LTA (natural log of total assets).
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics orr Raw Data
Mean
Minimum
Variable
Std. Dev.
RCAP (%)
1.20
4.70
0
DCAP (%)
1.02
1.75
0
.07
2.91
3.32
PB(#)
48.01
1.58
20.25
D(%)
CF (%)
8.09
12.38
-79.18
7.44
G(%)
14.20
-48.50
TA (millions of $)
1.926.71
2.24
8.559.60

RCAP
RCAP
DCAP
PBN
DN
CFN
G
LTA

Pane/ B: Correlation Mmm
DCAP
CFN
PBN
DN

Maximum
146.65“
31.75
45.30
99.22
61.90
98.50

G

LTA

1
.080
-.030
-.036
.080
-.027
.043

1
-.003
-.025
.142
-.118
.269

1
.053
.174
.087
.052

1
-.105
-.078
.286

1
.194
.187

1
.102

1

* Measuring RCAP using the average annual marital capitalization makes it possible for a firm
to repurchase over 100% of its market capitalization. Nitches accomplished this by
repurchasing $9,028 million of stock through a tender offer in the second week of its fiscal year.
Its average annual market capitalization was $6.77 million. The second highest RCAP was
47.6%.
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Panel B of Table 4-3 presents the correlation matrix for several variables
of interest.

RCAP and DCAP have a correlation of .08.

This positive

correlation supports the idea that repurchases are not substitutes for dividends
and vice versa.
The negative relationship between RCAP and PBN is stronger than the
negative relationship between DCAP and PBN (>.030 versus >.003).

One

interpretation of this finding is that PBN is more responsive to changes in
RCAP than to changes in DCAP, suggesting that repurchases send stronger
undervaluation signals than dividends.
RCAP and DCAP are each negatively related to DN and positively
related to CFN. These correlations imply that low financial leverage and high
cash inflows are conducive to firms distributing cash to shareholders.
The negative relationship between DCAP and G is much stronger than
the negative relationship between RCAP and G (-.118 versus -.027).

This

suggests that investment policy has a stronger impact on dividend policy than
on repurchase policy. This result is plausible if sales growth and asset growth
are related non-lineariy. For example, assume that a high-growth firm made a
large asset investment last year and that its asset base will support sales
growth for the next few years.

Also, assume that in a few years the firm

expects to make another big investment in assets in order to support its rapid
growth. If this firm currently has excess cash that needs to be distributed to
shareholders, it will likely choose a stock repurchase over a dividend
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distribution because repurchases can be discontinued without upsetting
investors.

Therefore, high-growth firms that expect to finance their asset

expansion in waves will probably be unwilling to commit to a perpetual cash
distribution policy such as a dividend and will be more likely to distribute cash
sporadically to investors through repurchases.
Each cash distribution variable (RCAP and DCAP) has a positive
relationship with LTA. One explanation for the positive relationships is agency
costs. If firm size is a proxy for the diversity of ownership, larger firms will
benefit more than smaller firms from cash distributions to shareholders
because of a greater reduction in agency costs.
The positive relationship between DCAP and LTA is much stronger than
the positive relationship between RCAP and LTA (.269 versus .043).

This

finding suggests that larger firms distribute relatively more cash through
dividends than through repurchases. Management in large firms may seldom
perceive that the firm's stock is undervalued because many analysts follow the
company.

Therefore, managers of large companies may decide simply to

distribute cash through an established dividend policy.
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Section 3: Estimation of the
Regression Equations
The results of estimating the Open Market Repurchase Model’s
regression equation over the sample of 1,587 firms are shown in Table 4 - 4 *
The motivations for repurchasing stock are assumed to be different for open
market repurchasing firms and tender offer repurchasing firms, therefore the
sample of 1,587 firms excludes the 11 tender offer repurchasing firms. The
results provide strong support for Propositions 1 through 5.

Firms with low

valuations as measured by PBN, low financial leverage as measured by ON,
high cash inflows as measured by CFN, low investment cash outflows as
measured by G, and more diversity of ownership as measured by LTA are
expected to repurchase larger percentages of their market capitalization in the
open market. Each coefficient estimate is significant at the 1% level.
A comparison of the three estimated coefficients of the standardized
variables (PBN, ON, and CFN) indicates that changes in CFN have the
greatest impact on RCAP. This suggests that distributing cash to shareholders
is a stronger motivation for repurchasing shares than taking advantage of
perceived undervaluation or increasing financial leverage.
The hazard rate, x i, is estimated jointly from the Stage 1 Probit Model
and the Stage 2 Regression Model.

It measures the likelihood that a firm

28 The Open Market Repurchase Model was also estimated using the Heckman two-stage
procedure, and the results are very similar. The coefficient estimates all have the
hypothesized signs, but t-statistics are lower. The adjusted R-squared is .26.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

64
repurchases stock in the open market. Its coefficient estimate is significant,
indicating that the two-stage procedure is important.

Also, the positive

coefficient estimate indicates that the likelihood that a firm repurchases stock in
the open market positively impacts RCAP.
The results of estimating the Tender Offer Repurchase Model over a
sample of 1,002 firms are shown in Table 4-5. The sample includes 11 tender
offer repurchasing firms and 991 non-repurchasing firms.

The model is

estimated using the Heckman two-stage procedure because this procedure
uses all 1,002 observations in the Stage 2 regression. Joint estimation uses
only observations for repurchasing firms in the Stage 2 regression.29 The
coefficient estimates of PBN and DN are negative, but insignificant.
The Small Firm Undervaluation Model is estimated in order to test
whether or not the undervaluation motive is stronger for smaller firms. The
sample of 1,598 firms includes 587 open market repurchasing firms, 11 tender
offer repurchasing firms, and 991 non-repurchasing firms.

The results of

estimating the Stage 2 regression are shown in Table 4-6 .30 The marginal
impact on RCAP of a one standard deviation movement in PBN for a firm in the
smallest total asset quartile is -2.13% . Alternatively, the marginal impact on

Joint estimation results in a targe standard error due to the limited number of tender offer
repurchasing firms and the substantial variation in RCAP. The coefficient estimates of PBN
and DN are negative, but the P-values are approximately 1.
The Heckman two-stage procedure yields results that are very similar. The coefficient
estimates all have the hypothesized signs, but the t-statistics are lower. The adjusted Rsquaredis.11.
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RCAP of a one standard deviation movement in PBN for a firm in the largest
total asset quartile is .76% (-2.13% + 2.89% ). The P-value for the difference in
the marginal impacts is .049.

This result supports Proposition 8, which

hypothesizes that the undervaluation motive is stronger for smaller firms.
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Table 4-4: Regression Results from the Open Market Repurchase
Model
RCAPi s Po + P1PBN1♦ feDNi ♦ PaCFNi ♦ P4G1♦ fcLTAt ♦ f)«i 1+ m
The dependent variable RCAP is the repurchase-to-market capitalization ratio.
PBN is the beginning of the year price-to-book value ratio normalized by
industry. DN is the beginning of the year debt-to-asset ratio normalized by
industry. CFN is the cash fiow-to-total asset ratio normalized by industry. G is
the five-year compound annual growth rate in sales. LTA is the natural log of
total assets, i squared is the joint normal distribution between the Stage 1
probit error term and the Stage 2 regression error term. Rho is the correlation
coefficient between the Stage 1 probit error term and the Stage 2 regression
error term. The sample includes 596 open market repurchasing firms and 991
non-repurchasing firms. The Stage 1 Probit Model and the Stage 2 Regression
Model are estimated jointly using the "Sampsel” command in TSP International
Version 4.4.

Variable
C
PBN
DN
CFN
G
LTA
A

X

Rho

Estim ated
Coefficient
-5.86
-.64
-.99
1.84
-.04
.65
5.62

1.00

t-statistic
-7.36
-2.81
-4.32
7.60
-2.96
5.35
42.75
3.62
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P-value (twotailed test)

.000
.005

.000
.000
.003

.000
.000
.000
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Table 4-5: Regression Results from the Tender Offer Repurchase
Model
RCAP, * Po ♦ piPBNi «■feDN, + 0 ,1 ,+ 4
The dependent variable RCAP is the repurchase-to-market capitalization ratio.
PBN is the beginning of the year price-to-book value ratio normalized by
industry. ON is the beginning of the year debt-to-asset ratio normalized by
industry. x squared is the joint normal distribution between the Stage 1 probit
error term and the Stage 2 regression error term. Rho is the correlation
coefficient between the Stage 1 probit error term and the Stage 2 regression
error term. The sample includes 11 tender offer repurchasing firms and 991
non-repurchasing firms. The Stage 1 Probit Model and the Stage 2 Regression
Model are estimated using the Heckman two-stage procedure in TSP
International Version 4.4.

Variable
C
PBN
DN
A

X

Estimated
Coefficient
.32
-.13
-.14
11.21

t-etatistfc
2.53
-1.05
-1.05
24.21
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P-value (tw o
tailed test!
.011
.295
.293
.000
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Table 4-6: Regression Results from the Small Firm Undervaluation
Model
RCAP, = 3o + 0iTA2i ♦ &TA3, ♦ frTA4, * fcPBN, + fr(PB N ,TA 2,) +
M PB N .TA 3.) ♦ M P B N fT M ) + W
♦ frC FN , + 0iOG, + 011; , + u
The dependent variable RCAP it the repurchase-to-market capitalization ratio.
TA2 is a dummy variable coded one for firms in the second total asset quartile
and zero otherwise. TA3 is a dummy variable coded one for firms in the third
total asset quartile and zero otherwise. TA4 is a dummy variable coded one for
firms in the fourth total asset quartile and zero otherwise. PBN is the beginning
of the year price-to-book value ratio normalized by industry. PBN*TA2,
PBN*TA3, and PBN*TA4 are interaction terms. DN is the beginning of the year
debt-to-asset ratio normalized by industry. CFN is the cash flow-to-total asset
ratio normalized by industry. G is the five-year compound annual growth rate
in sales. 1 squared is the joint normal distribution between the Stage 1 probit
error term and the Stage 2 regression error term. Rho is the correlation
coefficient between the Stage 1 probit error term and the Stage 2 regression
error term. The sample includes 596 open market repurchasing firms, 11
tender offer repurchasing firms, and 991 non-repurchasing firms. The Stage 1
Probit Model and the Stage 2 Regression Model are estimated jointly using the
"SampseP command in TSP International Version 4.4.

Rho

10

A

X

t-statlstlc
-8.76
CM

Variable
C
TA2
TA3
TA4
PBN
PBNTA2
PBNTA3
PBNTA4
DN
CFN
G

Estim ated
Coefficient
-8.84
-.35
3.09
5.49
-2.13
1.59
1.72
2.89
-1.74
2.78
-.05
11.67
1.00

2.26
3.89
•2.54
1.00
1.41
1.96
-3.40
5.16
-1.29
103.24
6.93
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P-value (tw otailed test)
.000
.804
.024
.000
.001
.317
.160
.049
.001
.000
.196
.000
.000

CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS
There are three primary conclusions of this study.

First, perceived

undervaluation, financial leverage, excess cash, and agency costs all play
important roles in determining the percentage of market capitalization a firm
repurchases in the open market Second, no evidence is found to support the
hypothesis that perceived undervaluation and financial leverage impact the
percentage of market capitalization a firm repurchases through a tender offer.
This is possibly due to the fact that only 11 tender offers were observed during
the period studied. Third, small firms are more likely to repurchase stock in
order to take advantage of perceived undervaluation, and large firms are more
likely to repurchase stock in order to reduce agency costs.
Section 1 of Chapter 5 reviews the eight propositions and the empirical
evidence relating to each one. Section 2 details the literary contributions and
managerial implications of this study.

Section 3 identifies limitations of this

study and presents directions for future research.

69
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Section 1: Propositions and
Empirical Evidence
This study investigates eight propositions presented in Chapter 1. The
propositions are restated in this section along with the evidence that supports
or refutes each one. The Open Market Repurchase Model (Equations 1-a and
1-b on page 50) is used to test Propositions 1 through 5. The Tender Offer
Repurchase Model (Equations 2-a and 2-b on page 50) is used to test
Propositions 6 and 7. The Small Firm Undervaluation Model (Equations 3-a on
page 50 and 3-b on page 51) is used to test Proposition 8.

Proposition 1:
Firms that appear undervalued relative to industry peers are motivated to
repurchase a greater percentage o f their market capitalization in the open
market in order to benefit long-term shareholders.
The regression results in Table 4-4 on page 66 support this proposition.
The proxy used for undervaluation is the price-to-book value ratio normalized
by industry (PBN), and its estimated marginal impact on the repurchase to
market capitalization ratio (RCAP) is negative and significant at the 1% level.

Proposition 2:
Firms that use little financial leverage relative to industry peers are
motivated to repurchase a greater percentage of their market capitalization in
the open market in order to move the firm closer to its optimal capital structure.
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The regression results presented in Table 4-4 on page 66 support this
proposition. The proxy used for financial leverage is the debt-to-asset ratio
normalized by industry (DN), and its estimated marginal impact on RCAP is
negative and significant at the 1% level.

Proposition 3:
Firms that have high cash inflows relative to industry peers are motivated
to repurchase a greater percentage of their market capitalization in the open
market. The larger a firm’s cash inflows, the greater the need to distribute cash
to shareholders, holding other factors constant
The regression results presented in Table 4-4 on page 66 support this
proposition. The proxy used to measure cash inflows is the cash flow-to-total
asset ratio normalized by industry (CFN), and its estimated marginal impact on
RCAP is positive and significant at the 1% level.

Proposition 4:
Firms that have lower investment cash outflows are motivated to
repurchase a larger percentage o f their market capitalization in the open
market The smaller the firm’s investment cash outflows, the greater the need
to distribute cash to shareholders, holding other factors constant
The regression results presented in Table 4-4 on page 66 support this
proposition. The proxy used for cash outflows is the compound annual growth
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rate calculated over the preceding five-year period (G), and its estimated
marginal impact on RCAP is negative and significant at the 1% level.

Proposition 5:
Firms that have more diverse ownership structures will repurchase a
larger percentage o f their market capitalization in the open market in order to
reduce agency costs.

Distributing cash through repurchases lowers agency

costs by forcing the company to rely more heavily on external funds.
The regression results presented in Table 4-4 on page 66 support this
proposition.

The proxy used to measure the diversity of ownership is the

natural log of total assets (LTA), and its estimated marginal impact on RCAP is
positive and significant at the 1% level.

Proposition 6:
Firms that appear undervalued relative to industry peers are motivated to
repurchase a greater percentage of their market capitalization through a tender
offer. A tender offer allows a firm to quickly repurchase a large percentage of
its stock, thus sending a powerful undervaluation signal to investors.
The regression results presented in Table 4-5 on page 67 provide no
support for this proposition.

The proxy for perceived undervaluation is the

price-to-book value ratio normalized by industry (PBN), and its estimated
marginal impact on RCAP is negative but insignificant at the 10% level. The
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insignificant coefficient estimate likely stems from having only 11 tender offer
repurchasing firms in the sample.

Proposition 7:
Firms that use little financial leverage relative to industry peers are able
to repurchase a greater percentage of their market capitalization through a
tender offer in order to take advantage of perceived undervaluation.
The regression results presented in Table 4-5 on page 67 provide no
support for this proposition. The proxy used for financial leverage is the debtto-asset ratio normalized by industry (DN), and its estimated marginal impact
on RCAP is negative but insignificant at the 10% level.

The insignificant

coefficient estimate likely stems from having only 11 tender offer repurchasing
firms in the sample.

Proposition 8:
The undervaluation motive to repurchase stock is stronger for smaller
firms because they are typically followed by fewer analysts and management is
therefore more likely to believe the firm is undervalued.
The regression results presented in Table 4-6 on page 68 support this
proposition. The estimated marginal impact of the price-to-book value ratio
normalized by industry (PBN) on RCAP for firms in the lowest total asset
quartile is negative and significant at the 1% level. The estimated marginal
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impact is higher for firms in the largest total asset quartile, and this difference is
significant at the 5% level.

Section 2: Literary Contributions
This study makes several literary contributions. It is the only study to
investigate share repurchase motivations by examining cash distributions made
to shareholders through share repurchases. Other studies have approached
this issue either through surveys or by focusing on share price reactions
following repurchase announcements. This is also the only study on share
repurchases that employs a censored regression model.
One significant conclusion of this study is that investment policy has a
stronger negative impact on dividend distributions than on repurchase
distributions. A plausible explanation for this finding is that high-growth firms
prefer to make any cash distributions to shareholders through an open market
repurchase because of its flexibility.

Open market repurchases can be

discontinued easily without upsetting the firm’s stock price. Alternatively, the
elimination of a dividend distribution is likely to upset investors and depress the
firm’s stock price. Therefore, it is concluded that high-growth firms have a
stronger aversion to paying dividends than to repurchasing stock.
Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) conclude that small firms
use tender offer repurchases to correct for undervaluation and large firms use
repurchases to restructure.

The present study's second contribution is the
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finding that small firms use repurchases either through the open market or
tender offers to correct for perceived undervaluation.
The third contribution of this study is that firms are motivated to
repurchase stock through the open market in order to take advantage of
perceived undervaluation, increase financial leverage, distribute cash to
shareholders, and reduce agency costs. This is also the first study to argue
that reducing agency costs motivates firms to repurchase stock in the open
market.

Section 3: Limitations and Directions
for Future Research
Several limitations exist regarding the application of the preceding
results. First, the sample consists of only U.S. firms that existed for the five
years prior to April 1,1997. Second, the firms in the sample were all relatively
healthy in that they all had positive equity book values for their fiscal year
ending no later than April 1, 1997.

Third, the results only apply to the

industries included in the analysis and the fiscal year under study. Changes in
the external environment, such as ordinary and capital gains tax rates, may
make some repurchase motivations more or less important.
In conducting this study, several directions for future research were
apparent.

First, there is no empirical study that analyzes total cash

distributions that firms make to shareholders.

This study looks at the

determinants of the repurchase distribution, and Rozeffs (1982) study looks at
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the determinants of the dividend distribution. No study, however, looks at the
determinants of the total cash distribution to shareholders.
Second, a limitation of previous studies by Rozeff (1982) and Casey,
Anderson, Dickens, and Mesak (1998) is that "unhealthy” firms were eliminated
from the study because of negative earnings and/or cash flows. W hile there
are disadvantages of expressing dividends as a percentage of market
capitalization, one significant advantage is that many unhealthy firms do not
have to be eliminated. An empirical study that analyzes the determinants of
dividend distributions, expressing dividends as a percentage of market
capitalization, would provide important insights.
Third, one could argue that the significant cut in the capital gains tax
rate from 28% to 20% in 1997 gives repurchases an even greater tax
advantage over dividends. A time series analysis should show a structural shift
away from dividends and towards repurchases in 1997. This issue could be
analyzed on a macro and micro level.
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Exhibit 2-1: Theoretical Justification for
Share Repurchases
Bierman, Jr. and West (1966)

Elton and Gruber (1968)

Vermaelen (1984)

Ofer and Thakor (1987)

Williams (1988)

Constantinides and Grundy (1989)

Bagnoli, Gordon, and Lipman (1989)

Talmor and Titman (1990)
Hausch and Seward (1993)

Persons (1994)

Repurchase distributions are more
tax friendly than dividend
distributions.
Considers transaction costs and
heterogeneous investors and
concludes that some companies find
a dividend strategy optimal, while
others find a repurchasing strategy
optimal.
Analyzes tender offers in a signaling
framework and determines that
management’s primary incentives
for signaling the market are to
prevent takeovers and to increase
the value of their stock options.
(1962-1977,131 tender offers)
Share repurchases elicit a higher
share price response than dividend
increases because of false signaling
costs.
Derives the efficient mix of
dividends, investments in real
assets, and new equity sales.
Provides justification for
repurchases that is not based on a
premium above the market price.
Repurchases are used as a
takeover defense by managers to
signal shareholders.
Compares the tax effects of dividend
distributions and share repurchases.
High-quality firms can distinguish
themselves from low-quality firms by
repurchasing shares.
The fixed-price method is a better
signaling device than the Dutch
auction method, but the Dutch
auction method is a better takeover
deterrent.
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Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1997)

Persons (1997)

Open market repurchase programs
create an option for management to
repurchase shares when the “true"
value is greater than the market
value. The price change during the
announcement period reflects the
value of this option. (1980-1990,
892 firms)
Develops a signaling model that
incorporates heterogeneous
shareholder reservation values.
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Exhibit 2-2.1: Repurchase Announcement Effects
on Share Prices: Tender Offers and
Open Market Repurchases
Stewart, Jr. (1976)

Oielman, Nantell, and Wright (1980)

Masulis (1980)

Dann (1981)
Vermaelen (1981)

Asquith and Mullins (1986)
Barclay and Smith (1988)

Netter and Mitchell (1989)

Repurchasing firms outperform non
repurchasing firms in the years
following a repurchase. (19541973, 5,591 repurchasing and
11.128 non-repurchasing firms)
Tender offers have a positive effect
on a company’s return in the short
run. (1957-1974.174 repurchases)
Calculates an average tender offer
announcement period return of 17%
and attributes the increase in wealth
to shareholder tax reductions and
wealth transfers from senior security
holders. (1963-1978,199
announcements)
Fails to support the expropriation
hypothesis. (1962-1976.143 offers)
Supports the signaling hypothesis
and analyzes the determinants of
the announcement period abnormal
return. (1962-1977,243 openmarket repurchases, 131 tender
offers)
Reviews work on equity cash flows.
Repurchase announcements cause
bid-ask spreads to increase, which
reduces liquidity and causes the
required rate of return on stock to
increase. (1970-1979, 244
announcements)
Firms announcing repurchase
programs following the October
1987 stock market crash earned
positive abnormal returns. (1987,
598 firms)
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Davidson and Garrison (1989)

Pugh and Jahera (1990)

Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1990)

Comment and Jarrell (1991)

Dann, Masulis, and Mayers (1991)

Hertzel and Jain (1991)

Bartov (1991)

Finds a negative price reaction to
tender offers used as a takeover
defense mechanism. (1978-1983,
62 firms)
Finds that the abnormal returns
earned during a tender offer are
positively related to a firm’s debt-toasset ratio. Supports leverage
hypothesis. (1978-1985, 32 firms)
Two trading rules involving tender
offers earn substantial abnormal
returns. (1962-1986,221 tender
offers)
Provides support for the signaling
hypothesis by analyzing abnormal
returns during the announcement
period for fixed-price tender offers,
Dutch auction tender offers, and
open market authorizations. (19841989,165 Dutch auction and tender
offers, 1,197 open market
announcements).
Concludes that a company typically
experiences a reduction in risk and
an increase in earnings following a
tender offer announcement. (19691978,122 repurchases)
Concludes that tender offer
announcements convey favorable
information about the level and
riskiness of future earnings. (19701984, 226 announcements)
Concludes that a company typically
experiences a reduction in risk and
an increase in earnings following
open market repurchase
announcements. (1978-1986,185
announcements)
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Howe, He, and Kao (1992)

Brown and Ryngaert (1992)

Singh, Zaman, and Krishnamurti
(1994)

Wiggins (1994)

Miller and McConnell (1995)

Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen
(1995)

Raad and Wu (1995)

Vafeas and Joy (1995)

Finds no evidence that Jensen’s
free cashflow theory explains the
market reaction to announced
tender offers. (1979-1989,115
announcements)
Argues that accepting stock from
another company is more costly
than tendering and paying capital
gains taxes. (1978-1986,143
tender offers)
Contrary to Barclay and Smith
(1988), they find that bid-ask
spreads do not increase following
open market repurchase
announcements. (1983-1990,181
open market repurchase
announcements)
Identifies firms that repurchased
shares and finds no change in their
bid-ask spreads. (1988-1990,195
open market repurchase
announcements)
Reports no change in bid-ask
spreads following open market
share repurchase announcements.
(1984-1988,248 announcements)
Firms announcing an open market
repurchase program earned positive
risk-adjusted returns in the four-year
period following the announcement.
(1980-1990.1.239 announcements)
Finds that net insider purchases of
stock prior to a share repurchase
announcement is a positive
determinant of the announcement
period abnormal return. (19821990.204 firms)
Finds that the abnormal return
associated with an open market
repurchase announcement is
negatively related to agency costs.
(1985-1992.162 repurchases)
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Ratner, Szewczyk, and Tsetsekos
(1996)

Tsetsekos, Uu, and Floras (1996)

Chhachhi and Davidson (1997)

Liu and Ziebart (1997)

Foqan and McCorry (1997)

Kadapakkam and Seth (1997)

The researchers find that a larger
tender offer announcement period
abnormal return is associated with
lower levels of institutional
ownership. (1970>1986, 88
announcements)
Finds that the market reaction to
repeat announcements is similar to
initial announcements. (1981-1988,
417 announcements)
The researchers find that tender
offer announcements generally have
higher abnormal returns than
specially designated dividend
announcements and attribute the
difference to taxes. (1978-1989,
117 observations)
Findings suggest that firms having
positive abnormal returns during the
announcement period tend to have
negative abnormal returns over the
10,40, and 60-day post
announcement periods. (19841989,244 observations)
Report that bid-ask spreads during
the announcement period of a Dutch
auction repurchase increase and
then decrease during the expiration
period. They attribute this to the
increased risk exposure of security
dealers during a Dutch auction
repurchase. (1981-1991,81
observations)
Findings indicate that abnormal
returns earned on the expiration day
of Dutch auction repurchases are
inversely related to the marginal
investor's capital gains tax rate.
This helps explain the upward
sloping supply curve in tender
offers. (1987-1989,42
observations)
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Exhibit 2-2.2: Repurchase Announcement Effects
on Share Prices: Targeted
Share Repurchases
Bradley and Wakeman (1983)

Dann and DeAngelo (1983)

Holdemess and Sheehan (1985)

Klein and Rosenfeld (1988)
Klein and Rosenfeld (1988)

Repurchases from insiders or small
shareholders increase the wealth of
non-participating shareholders.
Block repurchases decrease the
wealth of non-participating
shareholders. (1974-1980,25
insiders, 15 small holdings, and 61
block repurchases)
Calculates negative returns for
standstill agreements and block
repurchases. (1977-1980, 30
standstill agreements and 41
targeted repurchases).
Target firms earn a positive
abnormal return during the
purchase-to-repurchase period.
(1977-1981.12 repurchases)
Findings partially support
shareholders' interest hypothesis.
(1979-1983. 77 firms)
Firms that engage in block
repurchases have higher
management turnover, which
supports the management
entrenchment hypothesis. (19781983. 73 repurchases)
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Exhibit 2-3: Operating and Financial
Characteristics of Finns that
Repurchase Shares
Young (1969)

Norgaard and Norgaard (1974)

Finnerty (1975)

Medury, Bowyer, and Srinivasan
(1992)

Repurchasing firms use less
financial leverage, have relatively
lower operating performance, and
have relatively lower P/E ratios
when compared to non-repurchasing
firms. (1960-1967. 227 firms)
Repurchasing firms have lower
market-to-book value ratios, P/E
ratios, dividend payout ratios,
historical growth rates, liquidity
ratios, and higher debt-to-equity
ratios. (1973,60 repurchasing firms
and 60 non-repurchasing firms)
Equity issuers use more financial
leverage and have lower dividends
than equity repurchasing firms.
(1972. 715 firms).
Repurchasing firms use less
financial leverage, have less
liquidity, have higher dividend
yields, and are more profitability
than non-repurchasing firms. (19831986. 860 firms)
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Exhibit 2-4: Other Research
Austin (1969)

Baker, Gallagher, and Morgan (1981)

Kale, Noe, and Gay (1989)

Bagwell and Shoven (1989)
Denis (1990)

Gay, Kale, and Noe (1991)

Gay, Kale, and Noe (1991)

Tsetsekos, Kaufman, and Gitman
(1991)

Gay, Kale and Noe (1996)

Cudd, Duggal, and Sarkar(1996)

Concludes that using funds to
repurchase stock is an important
event. (1961-1967.1000 firms)
According to CFOs, the two main
reasons for repurchasing shares are
for investment purposes and to
acquire shares for stock options.
(1980, 73 repurchasing CFOs, 63
other CFOs)
Transferable put rights (TPRs) are
more tax efficient than fixed-price
tender offers.
Highlights ways that firms distribute
cash to shareholders.
Payout strategies in response to a
hostile takeover have differing
effects on shareholder value.
(1980-1987. 49 firms)
Dutch auctions and TPRs are
efficient and better for non-tendering
stockholders, but fixed-price tender
offers send the strongest signal.
Survey supports signaling
hypothesis and rejects dividend
substitution hypothesis. (1988,140
responses)
Survey of CFOs indicates that the
leverage hypothesis is the most
common motive for repurchasing
shares. (183 responses).
Finds that tender premiums in a
Dutch auction are negatively
associated with bidding competition
and positively associated with the
number of shares sought.
Shareholder wealth is positively
related to share repurchases that
are undertaken for control or for
signaling reasons. (1984-1987, 77
repurchases)
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Cole, Helwege, and Laster (1996)

Cash and Dickens (1996)

The dividend yield is low by
historical standards even after
adjusting for repurchases.
Discusses the tax consequences of
a share repurchase for an oil and
gas company and its shareholders.
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